The University of Chicago Business Law Review
Volume 1
Number 1 2022: Summer

Article 12

6-1-2022

Not-for-Profits, ESGs, and The Economic Structure of Corporate
Law
Saul Levmore
University of Chicago, dangelolawlib+saullevmore@gmail.com

Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/ucblr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Levmore, Saul (2022) "Not-for-Profits, ESGs, and The Economic Structure of Corporate Law," The
University of Chicago Business Law Review: Vol. 1: No. 1, Article 12.
Available at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/ucblr/vol1/iss1/12

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in
The University of Chicago Business Law Review by an authorized editor of Chicago Unbound. For more information,
please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.

Not-for-Profits, ESGs, and The Economic
Structure of Corporate Law
Saul Levmore
A compelling point in The Economic Structure of Corporate Law is that the
single goal of maximizing shareholder value is efficient and generally desirable because it gives the managers one aim—while leaving room for law and private contracts to impose constraints on the firm in order to control negative externalities and
other social concerns. Easterbrook and Fischel say that: “A manager told to serve
two masters (a little for the equity holder, a little for the community) has been freed
of both and is answerable to neither.” The point is an especially good one when the
manager has more of an interest in one master’s success than another’s, and this is
the point that Easterbrook-Fischel emphasize. But it is also the case that the single
goal of value maximization, encapsulated in share price in an efficient market, allows investors to monitor managers, not so much to look for misbehavior and the
prospect of a lawsuit, but to decide whether to invest in one enterprise or another. In
this Article, I ask what this brilliant insight tells us about not-for-profit (NFP) entities which do not offer “investors” (donors) or the law a single metric in order to
evaluate their performance. Should investors, and the “market,” prefer an NFP with
a single goal or cause, like the environment, however hard it is to measure progress
towards this goal, or should we expect the market—as we might think of the competition for donor dollars—to evaluate performance through some alternative mechanism, spread perhaps across a diversified portfolio inside the “firm,” including a
university or foundation? Falling in between these two types of opportunities for investment are self-proclaimed ESG (Environment, Social, and Governance) sensitive
corporations. These firms attract investors not only by earning profits and increasing shareholder wealth but also by adding to shareholder welfare with a promise to
undertake causes, like environmental sensitivity, that appeal to shareholders who
invest in these ESG-sensitive enterprises. Easterbrook-Fischel might be expected to
disparage the development of ESGs, because they intentionally depart from the single-goal advantage of conventional corporations. On the other hand, if some shareholders want not only to profit but also to pursue various social goals, a corporation
can appeal to these shareholders, even if their actual behavior is difficult to assess.
Not-for-profits are at the other end of the spectrum. They suffer from many of the
same problems. Investors have difficulty knowing whether an NFP is doing a good
job. One strategy, developed in this Article, is to follow the advice of donors who have
some incentive to evaluate the NFP and compare it with other organizations that
would be happy to take their gifts. This explains the ability of an NFP like Harvard
(the best endowed university) to receive support from private donors, foundations,
and the government. It might seem like a successful NFP does not “need” the money
as much as other, less well-endowed NFPs but, on the other hand, its ability to attract large gifts might inform new donors that it is a good investment, just as the
share price of a conventional corporate firm, or a takeover offer from a sophisticated
company, offers useful information. It also explains the tendency of NFPs to attract
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large gifts directed at specific goals. If donor Y sees that donor X gave $100 million
to an NFP to investigate a particular disease, donor Y might give that NFP a gift
because Y shares an interest in that cause, and now wants the recipient to do yet
more. Another potential donor, with a different goal in mind, might also learn from
X’s gift, and reason that the favored NFP is well-managed and reliable. Just as
Easterbrook-Fischel explained the advantage of a corporation’s obligation to follow
a single goal, an NFP can be understood as aiming to show that it follows the single
goal of reliability, and especially its ability to keep a promise about a single goal as
expressed by the investor, or donor. ESGs are unlikely to offer a comparable message
because it will not be clear to Y, or another investor, what to learn from a large
investment in an ESG corporation.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A compelling point in The Economic Structure of Corporate
Law, by Frank Easterbrook and Dan Fischel, is that the single
goal of maximizing shareholder value is efficient and generally
desirable because it gives the managers a single aim—while leaving room for law and private contracts to impose constraints on
firms. “[A] manager told to serve two masters (a little for the equity holder, a little for the community) has been freed of both and
is answerable to neither.”1 The point is an especially good one
when the manager has more of an interest in one master’s success
than another’s, and this is the point that Easterbrook and Fischel
emphasize.2 But it is also the case that the single goal of shareholder value maximization, reflected in the share price in an efficient market, allows investors to monitor and compare managers,
and then to decide whether to invest in one enterprise or another.
1
FRANK EASTERBROOK & DANIEL FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 38 (1991).
2
Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 311 (1976).
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In this Article, I ask what this Easterbrook-Fischel insight tells
us about not-for-profit (NFP) entities, which do not offer “investors” (donors), or even the law, a single metric in order to evaluate
their performance. Perhaps investors, and the “market,” will prefer a not-for-profit with a single goal, like its impact on the environment, however hard even that might be to measure. After all,
a concern for environment can be subdivided into many subgoals,
unlike a dedication to share value in a for-profit corporation. Alternatively, we might expect the market to evaluate performance
through some alternative mechanism, spread across a diversified
portfolio within an NFP, whether it be a university or foundation.
Falling in between these extremes are firms that attract investors
not only by earning profits, but also by adding to shareholder welfare by promising some sensitivity to causes that appeal to shareholders who invest in these Environmental-Social-Corporate Governance-aware enterprises, or ESGs.3 Easterbrook and Fischel
might be expected to disparage the development of ESGs, because
they intentionally depart from the single-goal advantage of conventional corporations. On the other hand, if some shareholders
want a reasonably high rate of return on their investments but
are willing to sacrifice a little wealth in order to pursue some social goals, a corporation can appeal to these shareholders. If ESGs
are a bit to the left of conventional value-maximizing firms, then
we can think of NFPs as yet further to the left, but as suffering
from some of the same problems as entities to their right. In the
NFP world, investors, also known as donors, and even some socially minded employees, have difficulty knowing which NFPs are
doing good work at reasonable cost. Investors would like to know
where to invest. They might not be able to exit in the manner of
someone who sells shares of a publicly traded corporation, but
they are likely to choose among NFPs when it comes to advancing
what they consider to be good work. One strategy, developed in
this Article, is for a donor to follow the advice of a large, earlier
donor who has some incentive to evaluate an NFP and compare it
to other organizations, often directed at the same goal, that would
be happy to accept a large gift. This explains the ability of an NFP
like Harvard (one of the largest NFPs) to continue to receive
money from private donors, foundations, and the government. It
might seem like a successful NFP does not need the money as
much as other less well-endowed NFPs, but its ability to attract

3
Oliver Hart & Luigi Zingales, Companies Should Maximize Shareholder Welfare
Not Market Value, 2 J.L., FIN., & ACCT. 247, 248 (2017).
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large gifts informs new donors that it is a good investment, just
as movement in the share price of a conventional corporate firm
offers valuable information to investors. The perspective developed here will also explain the tendency of NFPs to attract large
gifts directed at particular causes, perhaps in the same way that
investors in corporate stocks believe that some industries are better bets than others. If donor Y sees that donor X gave $100 million to an NFP to decode a particular disease, donor Y might give
that NFP a gift aimed at that goal, or even a large gift to do something completely different, because X’s confidence in the particular NFP as a steward informs Y of that NFP’s perceived reliability. Just as Easterbrook-Fischel explained the value of a
corporation’s obligation to follow a single goal,4 some NFPs can be
understood as aiming to be the best investment when it comes to
a specific social problem, while other NFPs show that they follow
the single goal of reliability across multiple subjects of interest.
Even these NFPs will be judged by their ability to keep a promise
about a single goal as expressed by the investor, or donor. On the
other hand, ESGs do not offer comparable information to investors, because it will be unclear to a potential investor what is revealed by another investor’s choice of an ESG-oriented corporation.
Part II reviews, and comments on, the Easterbrook-Fischel
contribution with regard to corporate profit maximization, or
more accurately, the maximization of shareholder value. Part III
presents the major argument here, as it considers how this insight can be applied to NFPs (not-for-profit entities). Part IV then
toys with the idea that the advantage that the single-goal approach offers to investors, who wish to compare investment opportunities, can be applied to ESG-oriented (Environmental, Social,
and
Corporate
Governance
sensitive)—but
forprofit—corporations. Part V concludes.
II. WHAT SHOULD FIRMS MAXIMIZE?
From Milton Friedman through Easterbrook-Fischel, most
economists have been drawn to the idea that firms should maximize shareholder value.5 The more managers of a for-profit firm
aim to maximize share price, or a suitable combination of that

4

See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 38–39.
For perhaps the most famous articulation of this idea, see Milton Friedman, A
Friedman Doctrine: The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 13, 1970), https://perma.cc/TU2U-FJUE.
5

2022]

Not-for-Profits and Easterbrook-Fischel

343

price and distributions to shareholders, the more these managers
have a single goal, and it is one that allows investors to evaluate
the managers’ performance. Managers can be rewarded in ways
that encourage their devotion to value maximization. There are
other parties, not to mention society as a whole, that care about a
corporation’s activities unrelated to, or even inconsistent with,
maximizing shareholder value, but these interests can, at least in
theory, be satisfied through other means, including contracts and
legal rules that firms will take into account as they maximize
shareholder value. For example, depending on the negative externalities a firm imposes, tort law or environmental regulations
might cause the firm to see that maximizing profit will require it
to avoid some tort judgments or regulatory fines and interventions. Value maximization thus allows many other goals to be
met, but this happens because law uses the single goal that corporate law encourages of the firm to take other matters, however
indirectly, into account.
The single goal idea is imperfect. One problem is that tax law
affects the behavior of managers and causes shareholders to have
divergent views of what exactly the firm is to maximize; every
shareholder’s wealth is not maximized the same way. A shareholder facing a low tax rate, or an NFP shareholder, like a university with no income tax obligation at all, might prefer high dividends, because this shareholder can face some constraints of its
own, allowing it to spend “earnings” rather than increases in the
value of its investments. A very different reason to prefer dividends, rather than a combination of payouts and retained earnings, is that the more a for-profit firm distributes its earnings, the
more it must seek new investments, or reinvestments, for new
projects, and the more the market will discipline the firm.6 At the
other extreme, there will be shareholders in high tax brackets,
who prefer that the firm retain earnings even if the next best opportunities available to the firm are somewhat inferior to other
investments available in the market. These shareholders benefit
by deferring taxation, and they will want the firm to maximize
shareholder value as understood by considering their own portfolios. Some of this diversity among shareholders can be satisfied
by publicly traded firms’ responding to these differences among
prospective investors. A subset of firms will adopt policies that
appeal to high tax bracket shareholders while other firms will not,

6
This is another Easterbrook insight, developed in Frank H. Easterbook, Two
Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 650, 654–55 (1984).
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so that a clientele effect produces a market that can appeal to a
variety of shareholders.7 Just as multiple stores might appeal to
buyers with different preferences, so too different publicly traded
firms will appeal to a variety of investors. For present purposes,
it is sufficient to think of all this detail as part of the claim that a
corporation should maximize shareholder value—acknowledging
that firms might actually be appealing to different subsets of
shareholders. It is fair to say that value-maximizing firms offer
investors a good means of evaluating these firms. They can look
at share prices and earnings, and compare changes to those produced in the market as a whole or by other firms in the same industry—thus controlling for industry specific variation, like environmental and legal changes that might have caused firms to
earn high or low returns in a given time period regardless of the
management’s skills. Meanwhile, investors have reason to discover not only the earnings of firms, but also their history of making distributions, as well as the riskiness of their operations, because investors would like to know the risk-adjusted returns of
firms as well as particular investors’ after-tax returns. The Economic Structure of Corporate Law was written with these things
in mind.
III. WHAT DO NOT-FOR-PROFIT ENTITIES (NFPS) MAXIMIZE AND
HOW ARE THEY EVALUATED?
A. The difficulty of assessing NFP performance
The fact that asking a for-profit firm’s managers to focus on
a single goal enables investors to evaluate that firm and its managers warns us that it is far more difficult to evaluate the performance of people and entities in other settings. Every sports fan
knows that it is difficult to compare the value of players. Baseball
player A might have a higher batting average than players B and
C, but B and C may have more runs batted in—and then B may
be on a superior team with more players on base when B is at bat.
A might commit more errors, but he might be faster and get to
more balls. It is no simple task to evaluate the players because of

7
Berkshire Hathaway, for example, virtually promises not to pay dividends but to
reinvest earnings. See Warren E. Buffett, Annual Shareholder Letter 2012, BERKSHIRE
HATHAWAY 19–21 (Mar. 13, 2013), https://perma.cc/YH38-J9UD. Shareholders can, of
course, sell shares as they like. A firm of this kind only shrinks if it redeems its own stock,
and in the normal course it does not return to the market to test its ability to raise funds.
On the other hand, the share price of the firm offers some indication of how the market
evaluates the firm’s ability to make profitable investments.
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the multiple characteristics that make for value. In the case of
sports, the difficulty of comparing players might add to fan interest, as they enjoy debating the quality of the players they follow.
Online betting has added to this interest, though by necessity it
focuses on particular characteristics of players and games,
thereby avoiding the difficulty of a single, overall valuation that
teams must consider when considering investments and trades.
The same might be true when it comes to evaluating politicians,
judges, and other players of interest to investors, voters, and employers. It is difficult to evaluate political candidates, though it is
easy to bet on election results. In these examples, as in the case
of corporations, it is also the case that past performance is not a
perfect indicator of future value. Even if baseball player A’s numbers are superior, B may be younger, and therefore more valuable
because of a longer expected career or a decreased likelihood of
injury. There are few entities and individuals that can be judged
with single metrics. A car salesperson might be easily compared
to another salesperson in the same dealership, but politicians,
friends, artists, vehicles, countries, novels, and faculty members
are far more difficult to evaluate. If money is not the goal, preferences differ among those who do the hiring and consuming, and
even when everyone agrees on the goal (like earnings, victories,
fan appeal, and law school grades—as opposed to potential as a
lawyer), the performance of a candidate in politics and in most
legal professions is more like that of a baseball player than that
of a corporation, which is instructed, and perhaps strongly encouraged by market pressure and structured compensation, to
maximize shareholder value. Corporations are relatively unusual
because the evaluators share a preference for wealth, and the
firms they evaluate can be measured in terms of the value they
are expected to produce.
Easterbrook-Fischel’s narrow (but important) focus on corporations, and especially publicly traded corporations, is not a defect of The Economic Structure of Corporate Law, because the
book does note the problems associated with telling a manager—rather than using environmental law or other legal mechanisms to affect the single goal of shareholder value—to care
about the environment along with, rather than as part of the
quest for, value.8 At the same time, it is useful to think of the
insights about value-maximizing firms as a springboard to understanding the structure of not-for-profit institutions. Consider the

8

EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 39.
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decision-making of a potential and well-meaning donor who cares
about the environment, scientific research, or the difficulties facing poor people in a distant country. One very clever and wellknown explanation of NFPs and the tax rules attached to them is
that it is difficult for the investor to monitor far-away entities.9 A
partial solution is to give the entity special status if it qualifies as
the right kind of NFP.10 The status includes freedom from taxation on the gifts made to it and on any earnings, or “related income,” it enjoys. In addition, qualified NFPs, the subset that qualify as 501(c)(3) organizations, can attract gifts because donors are
entitled to (somewhat limited) deductions for contributions,
which is another word for investments.11 One of the requirements
for this status is that invested and earned money cannot be distributed except in the form of reasonable salaries; there are essentially no owners of a qualifying NFP.12 The donor knows this
and might be willing to fund the NFP, even though its behavior
is difficult to observe, because at least the people who run the entity are not taking profit out for themselves. The managers are
employees with no claim on any residual earnings.13
This protection against the danger that managers will completely misuse the funds the NFP receives from trusting donors
is, however, not enough for many investors. The managers of the
NFP can arrange to take fairly large salaries, and they can shirk
or simply be incompetent. In the case of a public foundation, and
most other qualifying NFPs, these risks are in principle controlled by a board of directors that must have (the equivalent of)
outside directors.14 In addition, the state can step in if salaries are
9

Henry Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 843–45

(1980).
10

Id. at 883.
Id.
12 Id. at 838.
13 However, as Geoffrey Manne points out in Agency Costs and the Oversight of Charitable Organizations, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 227, 228–29 (1999), the nonprofit form partially
solves the contracting problem discussed by Hansmann by introducing new and sometimes
significant agency problems for the NFP. In the for-profit case, agency costs are managed
by largely self-enforcing mechanisms like shareholder monitoring and markets for corporate control. As Manne argues, NFPs lack both of these mechanisms because of the nondistribution constraint. Id. Investors can seek out poorly run for-profit organizations, attempt to take control of their management, and profit from any efficiency gains. Manne
notes that this is largely impossible in the NFP context because they are functionally “unowned,” and derivative lawsuits, which would ordinarily serve a similar function, are also
impossible. Id. at 235, 243–44.
14 The specific requirements for board membership depend on state law. The IRS
requires 501(c)(3) entities to file Form 990 if they receive over $200,000 in annual income
or have $500,000 in assets. The form requires the NFP to answer detailed questions about
the composition of the board of directors. The IRS recommends that the board be
11
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too large, and the matter comes to its attention; it is the party
best able to litigate against the NFP registered in its domain.15 As
a practical matter, what controls the behavior of NFP managers
is that they are likely to have self-selected in the first place as
people who are other-regarding or seek the approval of their societies, and they would like to attract more resources over time
from donors who will occasionally observe their performance, as
well as their compensation. Donors will be attracted to NFPs that
demonstrate that they have been using contributions wisely. Still,
on a larger scale, even if an NFP is run by dedicated and completely other-regarding persons, how would the average donor
discern whether this NFP is better than others? Even the most
honest and selfless manager might not be very good at her job, or
she might choose inferior projects to accomplish the goal that motivates the investor. In the case of conventional corporations, the
wealth-oriented investor can see how well this single goal is fulfilled, but where NFPs are concerned, it is very difficult to know
which NFP is doing the best job or can most effectively deploy
additional resources when it comes to the environment, to conducting research, and so forth.
B. Assessments through the work of large donors and through
matching-gift programs
Many NFPs try to solve the assessment problem facing potential investors by disclosing information and specific plans.
Some are required by law to show how much of what they take in
goes to managing the entity and to raising yet more money, rather
than to working on the goal that interests the donors.16 Moreover,
NFPs have every reason to advertise their accomplishments.
Much like for-profit corporations, and government officials, NFPs
rarely advertise their failures, even though doing so might make
discerning investors more confident about the reports they receive, but that is a subject for another day. NFPs that are searching for additional investments regularly publish magazines, visit
significant donors, and send e-mails to advertise their projects. In
theory, while they cannot distribute dividends, they can contract

structured so it “represents a broad public interest” and to avoid “insider transactions that
could result in the misuse of charitable assets.” IRS, GOOD GOVERNANCE AND RELATED
TOPICS – 501(C)(3) ORGANIZATIONS 3–4 (2008).
15 Hansmann, supra note 9, at 853.
16 The IRS requires a tax-exempt organization to make its recent filings available to
the public. Private foundations face the additional requirement of disclosing the identities
of substantial contributors. 26 CFR § 1.6033–2(a)(2)(ii)(F).
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if they cannot find better “investments”; they are not in a position
to repurchase stock, and they cannot pay dividends, but they can
transfer funds to other tax-protected NFPs, perhaps by asking
their own employees to choose other NFPs and then offering
matching-gifts programs. Such voluntary contracting by NFPs is
atypical, setting aside the distributions required of private foundations, which face limits on their ability to be a tax-favored holding-company that does not serve much of a public interest.17 For
most NFPs, targeted expansion is a more likely goal. They show
potential donors photographs of a child or of promising students
whose lives can be improved with a single gift. However, the donor does not know that this NFP will be particularly efficient in
advancing the advertised cause. An NFP is likely to communicate
its overall performance or its best projects, while donors should
probably be interested in marginal projects—as the best evidence
of what the NFP will accomplish with additional resources.
On a larger scale, some NFPs are designed to be intermediaries and to assess other hard-working NFPs on the ground. It is
understandable why an organization like the Ford Foundation,
which expends resources looking for the right causes to support
and then funds a large number of smaller NFPs focused on particular projects, does not ask individuals to give it more money so
that it can support yet more projects or give the selected subNFPs yet greater support. It would be unsurprising if the Foundation’s search costs and results would attract many individual
donors to it, the way a university attracts the support of individual, relatively uninformed, donors in the wake of large gifts from
donors who create new institutes. The Ford Foundation does,
however, encourage its own employees to take advantage of a
matching gift program; employees are invited to contribute to an
NFP of their own choosing, and the Ford Foundation matches
these gifts on a 3:1 basis.18 The MacArthur Foundation does the
same for its employees, and it provides a list of eligible recipients.19 A matching gift program of this kind should probably be
thought of as compensation to employees rather than as an efficient way to fund good works. The foundation presumably has
better information about the projects it studies than it or its
17 Private foundations are required to distribute a minimum of 5% of their average
non-charitable use assets per year. I.R.C. § 4942(e)(1). Private foundations that do not
meet this requirement are subject to an excise tax.
18 Matching Gift Program, FORD FOUNDATION, https://perma.cc/QTY9-TJZP (last
visited Feb. 11, 2022).
19 John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation Matching Gifts, DOUBLE THE
DONATION, https://perma.cc/7NTU-YRKT (last visited Feb. 22, 2022).
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employees have about the NFPs that the participating employees
elect to support; employees are not encouraged to name local organizations about which they might have greater knowledge. In
any event, it is hard for the typical individual, who wants to contribute to the betterment of our society, to assess the work of the
Ford Foundation. One can easily see how well a Vanguard account has performed in terms of maximizing wealth, even considering the fact that different Vanguard funds come with different
risks; each Vanguard vehicle has a single goal and can be compared to opportunities offered by other mutual funds that also
claim to help investors make (profitable) choices. In contrast, it is
very difficult for an individual to compare the Ford Foundation to
parallel foundations, universities, or other intermediaries.
Matching gifts are easy to understand when they are offered
inside a family or within most corporations—assuming one can
justify a corporation’s philanthropy rather than direct profit maximization. A profit-maximizing firm might want to be appreciated
rather than resented by local residents and politicians, so it has
reason to contribute to local causes and to gain good publicity as
a result. It will often offer its own employees the opportunity to
give on their own, and often to local causes, and promise to match
employee gifts up to some limit. The employees are likely to have
more information about local causes, and the matching gift program also serves as a fringe benefit to other-regarding employees.
Some employers restrict the program to a list of NFPs in order to
avoid disputes, encourage local causes, or avoid the likelihood
that some employees will simply be motivated by their private
preferences (for a church, for instance) rather than the community or other causes that are likely to give the employer a good
reputation, rather than provoke controversy.20
The fact that local employees might be well-positioned to assess the performance of particular NFPs points to the important
problem of assessing the performance of larger NFPs. The Easterbrook-Fischel approach suggests that the performance of publicly
traded corporations can best be evaluated by the market, and
20 The Ford Foundation, General Electric, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation,
Johnson and Johnson, and Apple all offer to match their employees’ donations up to certain thresholds. However, none of them will match donations to religious or political organizations. Many, like Apple and GE, also require that the organization does not discriminate against protected classes in their operations. A less charitable view of matching gift
programs is offered below, following some attention to the likelihood that a small donor
gets valuable information from the choices made by large donors. See Top Matching Gift
Companies, DOUBLE THE DONATION, https://perma.cc/K57S-XZ9H (last visited Feb. 22,
2022).
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especially so when the corporation is encouraged to focus on the
single goal of maximizing shareholder value.21 A typical investor
can be seen as benefitting from the wisdom of the crowd of investors and, no doubt, from the above-average information garnered
by large investors who can be imitated or who simply have substantial impact on market prices. In the case of a sizeable NFP,
however, there is no market price for prospective donors to observe, but they can still free-ride on other, better informed donors.
If donor C sees that donor D gives $100 million to support research through the American Cancer Society, C might reason that
D has investigated the field and decided that this is the best place
to invest that considerable sum. It is rational for C to direct a
$500 gift to that NFP rather than another, especially if C has already decided to support the cause of cancer research. It is noteworthy that NFPs, like the American Cancer Society, normally
advertise large gifts. The conventional wisdom is that the advertisement serves to enhance the donor’s social standing, but another way to look at it is that it motivates people like C, who have
neither the time nor skill to study the various organizations devoted to the cause C cares about. It may be inefficient for C to
search. If searching costs $250, C will be left with the ability to
give a $250 gift; C might do more good selecting a certified NFP
at random, and C is likely to do best by with the $500 by copying
D, inasmuch as D is likely to have studied the field before choosing where to invest $100 million. C spends virtually no effort discovering that D has selected an NFP like the American Cancer
Society, so that following D’s lead is a very efficient way to support the cause that already appeals to C.
Free-riding in this way is not a perfect solution to the problem
of selecting and assessing the provider of a good deed. It is possible that D chose the recipient in order to secure a position on its
board and obtain the social approval that goes along with this position.22 It is also possible that D is securing employment for several family members who want to work for the organization,
though this is an expensive way to secure employment. In theory,
it is also possible that D could have given a bit more than $100
million but studied the matter and decided that the chosen NFP
would experience diminishing marginal returns as it expanded its
reach. D may have decided that the next $500 he gives away
would be better deployed elsewhere. But all these possibilities
21

See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 1, 38–39.
Divergent motivations increase monitoring costs, as noted by Geoffrey Manne, supra note 13, at 233–35.
22
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seem rather remote. It is plausible that C will do well to free-ride
on D, just as some investors free-ride on Warren Buffett’s choices
when it comes to investing for profit.
Rational donors must also recognize cases where larger donors are unlikely to have good information, as well as cases where
there is no economy of scale on which a large donor can capitalize.
At a local level, even very small donors can assess the value of
modest contributions. This was part of the argument, made earlier, about employers’ matching-fund programs. Small donors can
also band together through their own trusted intermediaries, that
often concentrate on local causes unobserved by large far-away
NFPs. If someone belongs to a church and has some confidence,
or faith, in how the church is run and how it helps poor people,
the donor might be comfortable giving, or even tithing, to the
church. A small donor who cares about feeding poor people, might
volunteer or contribute to a local soup kitchen. The donor knows
more about the effectiveness of this NFP than does the donor’s
employer, or a large far-away NFP, or the national government—however much the latter two entities care about feeding
poor people. Other small donors might rely on a local church to
supervise the soup kitchen and encourage contributions to it. Occasionally a church will also investigate far-away causes and encourage church members to contribute to the church which will
then support some of the far-away causes. The donor trusts the
church to make local and even world-wide assessments much as
a purchaser of stock trusts the market or a large investor to assess
the potential of a given publicly-traded corporation.
Most potential donors will have trouble deciding among
NFPs. An unusually optimistic donor could overpay on her taxes
and simply give more money to the government, if she thinks the
government is so well-run that it can be trusted to spend on good
causes, whether these aim to provide food to the hungry, repair
bridges, or redistribute wealth. For a variety of reasons this is
rare. A donor who gives to the United Way can be fairly confident
that it is redistributing wealth, while contributions to the government might fund more national defense. Still, a preference for the
United Way or even the American Cancer Society, over an individual’s overpayment of taxes, demonstrates some inconsistency
on the part of that person’s claim that tax rates and government
spending ought to be higher than at present. Individuals, especially high-income persons, who argue for higher taxes could
simply give more of their own money to the government, which is
itself a well-studied intermediary. At the very least they could
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favor a higher marginal tax rate on high earners along with a tax
credit for contributions to certified NFPs. Instead, the government’s own matching program is more modest; the government
matches only some gifts by offering charitable deductions to the
tax-paying donors.23 This deduction can be understood as the government’s “giving” money to causes that individual citizens know
more about than do far away government officials.24 Essentially,
the government offers its own matching-fund program, not to employees but to taxpayers, and it does so with significant limitations.25
C. Large gifts and the single-goal solution
It is useful to restate and then expand upon the connection
between this argument about NFPs and Easterbrook-Fischel’s insistence that corporate law is and should be directed to giving
managers a single goal.26 They argue that donors and social welfare are better off with a single-goal system—and the point here
begins with the observation that the single-goal idea, or solution,
is unavailable where NFPs are concerned. NFPs do not come with
a sensitive market price or another measurement of effectiveness;
with rare exception, it is difficult to attach a number to what they
accomplish each year and to the impact that additional funds
given to them are likely to make in the future. The suggestion in
this Article is that there is something of a substitute in the form
of information about the investments undertaken by large donors.
A small investor, or donor, can free-ride on the decision-making
of large donors, who create a kind of market that helps small investors choose among entities that claim, and for the most part
honestly aim, to solve one or more social problems. The large donor normally has a single goal, whether it is to improve the environment or conduct cancer research. When the thoughtful large
donor gives a huge sum to NFP-1, it makes sense for the more
modest donor to do less searching and, instead, to follow the large
donor’s lead in the direction of NFP-1. In turn, NFP-1 has every
reason to try to attract a large donor like D, because that in turn
will make smaller, rational donors like C invest yet more in the

23

See I.R.C. § 170.
Saul Levmore, Taxes as Ballots, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 387, 388 (1998).
25 For a discussion of present law, and how it might be improved, see Daniel
Halperin, Legislative Options for Simplifying and Restructuring the Charitable Deduction,
URBAN INST. (Dec. 2012), https://perma.cc/3RLK-DVPZ.
26 See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 1, 38–39.
24
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same NFP, once the smaller donor has chosen the cause that D
has also selected.
It is even possible that a small and socially minded donor,
like C, is uncertain about which cause—or sub-cause in the case
of a broad goal like helping poor people or improving the environment—to address, and C free-rides on D’s choice of both cause and
NFP. After all, a careful C might try to maximize social welfare
and might have compared NFP-1’s work on a given social problem
to other opportunities for socially-minded investments, even if
these address other problems than the one addressed by NFP-1.
It is more likely, however, that a rational C has as much information or as strong preferences about social causes than does D
or other well-positioned, socially minded donors. In that case, C
chooses an area of concern, and then looks to see the choices made
by informed donors in that area.27 One test is to look for NFPs
that have recently attracted large donors, and this is similar not
only to investing where Warren Buffett invests, but also to looking at market prices where the market is full of firms that are
managed with an eye only on maximizing shareholder value.
There are a number of examples of this investment pattern. For
instance, the Pearson Family Foundation had no previous affiliation with the University of Chicago, but it had a longstanding interest in world peace and means of avoiding global conflict. The
Foundation gave $100 million to support the family’s favorite
cause at the Harris School at the University, and then invited
smaller donors to follow their lead.28 The Foundation might in the
future tie its contributions to those of smaller donors, and

27 Expanding mandated disclosures for NFPs is frequently proposed as a solution for
this problem. However, it is not likely to succeed for many donors due to the costs incurred
in making use of the disclosed information. As Lumen N. Mulligan notes in his discussion
of proposals for a Sarbanes-Oxley equivalent for nonprofits, the average donation size is
simply too small to make it cost-efficient to consider disclosures closely. What’s Good for
the Goose Is Not Good for the Gander: Sarbanes-Oxley-Style Nonprofit Reforms, 105 MICH.
L. REV. 1981, 1996–99 (2007). Indeed, as proposed here, trailing large donors is a way of
achieving both the disclosure and more of its benefits without legal mandates. As Mulligan
notes, large donors can extract desired information about the NFP by conditioning their
gift on disclosure, and the costs they incur to fruitfully consider it will be a negligible
portion of the overall donation while it may eclipse the entire value of the average donation.
28 Dawn Rhodes, Pearson Family Members Foundation Sues University of Chicago,
Aiming to Revoke $100M Gift, CHI. TRIBUNE (Mar. 6, 2018, 6:15 AM),
https://perma.cc/NV3C-Z5MS. It happens that the donors and the university then had a
dispute, id., but setting aside the details of the various complaints, this can be taken as a
sign that the donor (which had also claimed that a prior religious organization had defaulted on promises made when acquiring a gift from the Pearson family, id.) was in a
position to monitor the NFP.
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perhaps (as in the case of National Public Radio) do so not just to
encourage their contributions with a reverse matching fund program, but to get a sense of the smaller donors’ enthusiasm for the
NFP’s work. Note that donors to Public Radio are likely to be people who listen to programs and therefore have information about
the NFP’s performance; the large donor might do well to copy the
small donors, rather than the other way around. The more common solution to the problem of finding causes is more obvious and
already mentioned; a donor who is comfortable with an intermediary’s goals, like that of her church, can use the church as an
intermediary and as an organization that solves the collective action problem shared by parishioners. The novel point in this Article is to see the role played by large donors.
Another way to think about this novelty, or strategy, is to ask
why C does not look to see where D contributes funds in a political
campaign. The answer is obvious and reveals the difference between D and a parishioner’s church. The two investors, C and D,
might not share preferences, or what we commonly call values.
The smaller investor, C, has as much information as the larger
one, D, about worthy goals and about C’s preferences about goals.
D’s value is in ascertaining the effectiveness of particular NFPs
in achieving a goal. In the realm of politics, C has no reason to
think that D’s preference for a political party or even for a candidate within a party is superior to C’s. C should be more interested
in D’s choice among cancer research institutes than in D’s choices
when it comes to political parties or religious denominations.
The approach advanced in this Article solves, or at least helps
with, a familiar puzzle, even as it expands the analogy to Easterbrook-Fischel’s thinking. The puzzle is why people give money to
a well-endowed institution, like Harvard. One often hears students (though not at the University of Chicago Law School, of
course!) claiming they will not donate to universities in the future, because the universities with which they are familiar have
so much money already and surely do not need more. But the argument here is that the more money an NFP like Harvard has,
and especially the more its resources are the product of recent
gifts, the more it is rational for one who cares about education,
student debt, or research, to give money to Harvard (or, if I can
lure the reader, to the University of Chicago) because people who
had reason to study the matter chose to invest there. The new
socially-minded donor will probably better advance the social interest by free-riding, after a fashion, and giving to the University
than by choosing on her own to give to a cause that is almost
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impossible for her to evaluate. Easterbrook-Fischel argued that
corporate managers should follow a single goal to enable monitoring and avoid the problem of a manager following her own preferences.29 A large investor will study a firm, compare it to others in
the industry, and assess the value of its intellectual property and
other assets that are not ordinarily visible. In the case of Harvard,
or distant NFPs quite generally, it is almost impossible for most
potential donors to assess the NFP’s efficiency or likely contribution to society, and then compare the value of a gift to one NFP
rather than another. But these investors can come close to the
ideal searching and assessing of NFPs by imitating the behavior
of very large and well-motivated donors.
Viewed in this manner, the assessment service provided by
large donors does suggest some new puzzles even as it solves others. Consider again the popularity of employers’ matching-gift
programs. As suggested, the employer might encourage or use local information available to employees. The employees are better
informed than the employer. At the same time, to be sure, the
employer develops some good will. But the information or assessment component of this claim does not work for the Ford or MacArthur Foundations. These are NFPs that specialize in assessing
individuals or smaller NFPs. It would make sense for an employee who is charitably inclined to copy an employer’s judgment,
when that employer is such a large foundation, rather than for
the large foundation to free-ride on the assessments of its employees. Counter-intuitively, an outsider might think less of the Ford
Foundation when it offers a matching-gift program because it can
be taken as a signal that the Foundation and its employees think
that the employees are better at choosing causes in which to invest than is their employer, which is supposed to be a specialist
in assessing causes and smaller organizations that claim to be
skilled at addressing social problems (identified by the larger
NFP) on the ground. If an employee returned some of her salary
to the Ford Foundation, that would be impressive and, indeed,
some faculty members donate to their universities—and this
greatly impresses less-informed donors. One possibility is that
the employee finds a local cause to benefit, and this is a deserving
recipient, but one that is outside the mission of the large foundation. Another optimistic thing to say is that when the money
moves in the other direction, with the foundation matching the
contributions of its employees, the aim is to raise employee

29

EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 1, 38–39.
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morale or to suggest a pattern of matching gifts to other employers, rather than to maximize the social value of contributions. For
the most part, these explanations are insufficient because the
largest foundations with matching gift programs are willing to
match employee gifts to NFPs that the foundation could have supported but did not.
There is yet another puzzle with respect to a well-informed
intermediary, like the Ford Foundation, offering its employees a
matching-gift program. The program might be expected to increase gift-giving by an employee, because she sees her gift multiplied. We have seen the negative implication that might be
drawn from the matching gift; the employee knows a good deal
about the Foundation and yet, apparently, chooses to give money
elsewhere. Another problem is that the program takes money
away from the Foundation’s chosen causes. Imagine that the employee gives $100 to a cause, and this turns into $400 because of
the Foundation’s 3:1 matching program. This takes $300 away
from the “superior” causes chosen by the Foundation, but perhaps
the rational employee and Foundation think that $400 to a
slightly inferior recipient, as chosen by the employee, does more
social good than $300 to the better cause selected by the Foundation. For this reason, the Foundation is eager to encourage its employees to give gifts that will be matched. But the problem with
this is that the employee can give $100 to a cause, whether it is
or is not one chosen by the Foundation, and not ask for the match.
Again, when the employee asks for a gift to be matched, the action
sends something of a negative signal about the employee’s assessment of what the Foundation chooses to do—unless the employee’s gift is to an entity that is outside the purview of the Foundation.
Returning to the information provided by most large donors,
and setting aside the prevalence of matching gifts and intermediating foundations, the argument offered in this Article is strongest where the trailing donor shares the goal of the earlier, more
significant donor. But in an important way the argument remains, and it draws yet more attention to the Easterbrook-Fischel
way of thinking, where the two donors’ interests are only slightly
connected.30 If C wants to support cancer research and is deciding
among NFPs, and C observes that a significant donor, E, gives
$100 million not to a university’s cancer research laboratories but

30 Cf. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 11 (discussing the rationality of
passive investing).
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rather to the cause of financial aid for its students, C might still
reason that E has decided that the university is a well-run organization; when it comes to financial aid, such a well-run organization is more likely to choose the right financial-aid recipients, and
administer funds quite efficiently, than would other organizations. This comes closer to mimicking Easterbrook-Fischel’s argument, because the observed university is strongly encouraged to
show reliability, which can be thought of as a single goal. The signaling is especially good if the significant donor did not attend the
university, so that the donation is a real investment decision rather than a reaction that might derive from gratitude alone. But
even gifts from donors who have some personal connection to the
NFP are meaningful, inasmuch as these large-scale donors are
likely to have relatively good information about the efficiency of
the NFP, and they certainly have other causes, and emotional attachments, that compete for their gifts, just as publicly traded
corporations and mutual funds compete with one another. In reality, of course, most large investments in a university are motivated by a combination of confidence in the university and personal connection, but they convey information to other potential
investors. This last observation suggests that the argument advanced in this Article is more secure as a normative rather than
descriptive matter. There are surely some cases where small donors follow the lead of large ones, who have no emotional tie to
the NFPs they fund. It is easy to say that large donors use a combination of emotional ties and factfinding to choose the objects of
their largesse, but the relative importance of these factors is difficult if not impossible to discern. The normative appeal of the
argument advanced here also suffers from the problem of discerning whether the lead donor has assessed the quality of the NFP
or is simply drawn to it for personal reasons. Still, if the small
donor sees that a more significant donor chooses to give a huge
gift to a university or to the American Cancer Society in 2022,
when the assessment or personal obligation could have produced
a sizeable gift in an earlier or later year, it is reasonable for the
smaller donor to think that the larger one has confidence in the
current management of the NFP or in a project it has recently
undertaken.
A surprising product of this analysis is the light it casts on
the usual claim of NFPs, that they prefer unrestricted gifts. On
the one hand, this allows a well-informed manager, like a Dean,
to use up-to-date information in order to decide where new resources are best applied. If donor F targets a very substantial gift
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to the University of Chicago’s Housing Clinic, valuable information is provided to other donors who are already interested in
housing-related work. As already emphasized, F’s gift provides
information about the University’s reliability, as apparently
judged by F, but this is not quite as valuable as what has been
provided to a donor already interested in housing. And yet, if donor G gives a huge unrestricted gift, another donor with a preference for housing work might reason that G has signaled through
the unrestricted gift that the Law School’s Dean is especially reliable. The unrestricted gift gives direct information about reliability and good decision-making, rather than about the work of
one particular clinic.
IV. ESG THINKING
While the single-goal idea is helpful when it comes to NFPs,
even if slightly off the mark because NFPs are not out to maximize shareholder value, it is less helpful, or perhaps completely contrary, to the ESG (Environmental-Social-Governance) movement.
That movement encourages corporations to say and to believe
that they are not aimed at the single goal of maximizing shareholder value, but rather at maximizing a larger conception of
shareholder welfare, by taking the environment and other causes
into account.31 If shareholders care about the environment, then
(as the best ESG argument goes32), their corporation might do
well by maximizing shareholder welfare, and this includes not
just profits but also a concern for the environment and perhaps
also the wage distribution among its workers, even when these
interior concerns will reduce profit and shareholder wealth. I
have argued elsewhere that the argument is difficult to sustain;
it might require a belief that the corporation can do more for these
causes than can another organization, likely a dedicated NFP,
that a shareholder can fund on her own after receiving a larger
dividend from the for-profit corporation with the single goal of
maximizing shareholder value.33
But, returning to the single-goal idea, consider how difficult
it is to compare ESG-driven corporations. First, there is currently
no requirement for a corporation to reveal how much profit was
sacrificed for the cause of socially beneficial projects.34 Indeed,

31
32
33
34

Hart & Zingales, supra note 3, at 265.
Id. at 248.
Saul Levmore, Least-Cost Altruists and ESG, BUS. LAW. (forthcoming 2022).
Id.
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some ESG supporters, and even some corporations and notable
mutual fund managers, insist that many ESG causes increase
shareholder value. This is certainly plausible but, if it is the case,
an ESG orientation is consistent with maximizing shareholder
value, and with Easterbrook-Fischel thinking; it is non-ESG corporations that would have explaining to do, unless the claim is
that only some corporations maximize value by doing things like
raising minimum wages or exceeding legal requirements with respect to the environment. Second, it will be difficult for investors
to know whether a corporation is any good at fulfilling the ESG
goals. An investor who wants to do more for income equality, for
example, needs to know whether a corporation should sacrifice
some earnings in order to raise the wages of its lowest paid employees, open factories in what it previously considered to be
suboptimal locations, or lower the pay of its highest paid managers. One alternative is to do none of these things, in order to raise
the value of the corporation and allow shareholders to decide how
much money to give to poor people or to causes directly addressing
wealth distribution matters—and then which NFPs will most
likely and most efficiently accomplish these goals. The ESG idea,
almost by definition, addresses multiple goals, and as we have
seen, managers will not know what precisely to maximize, and
investors will be unable to monitor their ESG performance.
In the case of NFP organizations, this Article has argued
that, at least in theory, investors can, and perhaps should, follow
the lead of large donors who have the ability and incentive to see
where their contributions are best used. If investors see that a
large donor gives a large sum to the American Cancer Society or
to a local women’s shelter, then investors of more modest means
have valuable information. In support of this argument, it is interesting that unlike modest contributors, who often give relatively small contributions to tens of organizations, most donors
who can afford to give millions of dollars, usually choose one or
two organizations and give the bulk of their money to these NFPs,
whose work they have presumably studied. If their motive is to
gain recognition or to advertise their wealth, they could simply
give a very large gift to an intermediary like the United Way or
even the government; a gift to the latter would surely generate
attention. It seems unlikely that someone who considers a $100
million gift to the American Cancer Society or to Harvard, would
instead invest that sum in a single ESG-oriented corporation, or
would invest $1 billion there, figuring that the corporation probably sacrifices 10% of its potential profit in order to support an
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ESG cause that it had carefully considered. If a very wealthy,
thoughtful, and socially minded person chooses a cause, then it is
rational for a modest donor to follow this lead, or at least to minimize the second donor’s search effort. This pattern is something
of an alternative, or imitation, of the argument for a single goal
in the case of for-profit corporations.
In sum, most investors—whether we apply the word to people
seeking more wealth or to funding the work of NFPs—benefit
when a single goal is attached to a conventional corporation, and
they also benefit by the (nearly) single goal that takes the form of
a large donor’s selection of an NFP. In turn, the NFP has an incentive to attract large donors. But this logic does not seem to
apply to ESGs. The growth of the ESG movement is likely to be
about something else. It might be that investors are virtue signaling to themselves or to others, or it might be that there is simply
disutility associated with investing in a corporation that is perceived as doing harm to others even as it profits its investors.35
The Easterbrook-Fischel insight addressed in this Article can be
applied, albeit with considerable variation, to not-for-profits, but
not, or at least not easily, to ESGs.
V. CONCLUSION
Easterbrook and Fischel stress that shareholder value maximization is and ought to be a single goal for a corporation, and
that this single goal is an effective way of telling managers what
they ought to do.36 The single-goal approach, along with sophisticated thinking about Coasian bargains, is shown by EasterbrookFischel to inform a great deal of corporate law.37 This Article has
stressed the other side of the coin. A single goal makes it much
easier for investors to assess managerial behavior and performance, and to compare corporations in which they might invest.
The difficulty of monitoring distant not-for-profit entities is something stressed by Henry Hansmann in developing the idea that
the tax advantage of an NFP comes with the requirement that it
not distribute funds or “profits” to its managers or investors.38 But
35 If the disutility associated with something unpleasant does the work here, then
some of the problems developed in this article disappear. Investors in ESGs may not really
care about the allocation of the corporation’s effort among causes, inasmuch as the investor simply wants to avoid an association with a corporation that declines to identify with
the ESG movement and is therefore something to be avoided. Even if this is the case, the
investor would benefit from information about how much value is lost to this cause.
36 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 1, 38–39.
37 Id.
38 Hansmann, supra note 9, at 874–75.
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this Article has advanced the idea that NFPs can also be seen as
having something of a single-goal, and ease-of-assessment. Here,
investors have even more difficulty than when they consider investments in widely traded stock, but in both cases they can follow the lead of very large investors, called donors in the world of
NFPs, who might well study their options in order to decide where
to invest in order to advance their goals. In turn, NFPs have reason to attract these investors, and then to gather resources from
smaller investors who follow the lead of well-informed investors.
On the other hand, ESG-oriented corporations, while also difficult
to assess, are unlikely to offer this advantage to large and then to
modest investors, precisely because their behavior cannot be evaluated with a single metric. The single-goal approach tells us
something new about NFPs, and it is likely good news, but it does
not inform or make one optimistic about ESGs.

